Language’s intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production (...) of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans. (shrink)

Language's intentional nature has been highlighted as a crucial feature distinguishing it from other communication systems. Specifically, language is often thought to depend on highly structured intentional action and mutual mindreading by a communicator and recipient. Whilst similar abilities in animals can shed light on the evolution of intentionality, they remain challenging to detect unambiguously. We revisit animal intentional communication and suggest that progress in identifying analogous capacities has been complicated by (i) the assumption that intentional (that is, voluntary) production (...) of communicative acts requires mental-state attribution, and (ii) variation in approaches investigating communication across sensory modalities. To move forward, we argue that a framework fusing research across modalities and species is required. We structure intentional communication into a series of requirements, each of which can be operationalised, investigated empirically, and must be met for purposive, intentionally communicative acts to be demonstrated. Our unified approach helps elucidate the distribution of animal intentional communication and subsequently serves to clarify what is meant by attributions of intentional communication in animals and humans. (shrink)

BackgroundHealthcare providers have to make ethically complex clinical decisions which may be a source of stress. Researchers have recently introduced Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based applications to assist in clinical ethical decision-making. However, the use of such tools is controversial. This review aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the reasons given in the academic literature for and against their use.MethodsPubMed, Web of Science, Philpapers.org and Google Scholar were searched for all relevant publications. The resulting set of publications was title and abstract (...) screened according to defined inclusion and exclusion criteria, resulting in 44 papers whose full texts were analysed using the Kuckartz method of qualitative text analysis.ResultsArtificial Intelligence might increase patient autonomy by improving the accuracy of predictions and allowing patients to receive their preferred treatment. It is thought to increase beneficence by providing reliable information, thereby, supporting surrogate decision-making. Some authors fear that reducing ethical decision-making to statistical correlations may limit autonomy. Others argue that AI may not be able to replicate the process of ethical deliberation because it lacks human characteristics. Concerns have been raised about issues of justice, as AI may replicate existing biases in the decision-making process.ConclusionsThe prospective benefits of using AI in clinical ethical decision-making are manifold, but its development and use should be undertaken carefully to avoid ethical pitfalls. Several issues that are central to the discussion of Clinical Decision Support Systems, such as justice, explicability or human–machine interaction, have been neglected in the debate on AI for clinical ethics so far.Trial registrationThis review is registered at Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/wvcs9). (shrink)

Theories of practical reason must meet a psychological requirement: they must explain how normative practical reasons can be motivationally efficacious. It would be pointless to claim that we are subject to normative demands of reason, if we were in fact unable to meet those demands. Concerning this requirement to account for the possibility of rational motivation, internalist approaches are distinguished from externalist ones. I defend internalism, whilst rejecting both ways in which the belief‐desire model can be instantiated. Both the Humean (...) and the Kantian instantiation of that model fail to account for the internal connection between normative and motivating reasons required by internalism. The two classes of reasons rather come to be seen as mutually exclusive. Opposing the belief‐desire model, I argue that rational motivation can only be established by reference to emotion. Emotions are affective perceptions. They have motivational force so that they can contribute to the explanation of action. At the same time they can rationalise actions because they have an intentional content which resembles the content of sensory perception in being representational. Because of this, the emotions can noninferentially justify judgements, which in turn can justify actions. I conclude by outlining the Aristotelian account of practical reason and ethics that emerges from integrating the emotions into practical reasoning. Doing the right thing is much more a matter of seeing things right than of drawing the right inferences. Seeing things right, in its turn, is not only to justify an action: it necessarily implies to be motivated to act accordingly. (shrink)

I discuss two ways in which emotions explain actions: in the first, the explanation is expressive; in the second, the action is not only explained but also rationalized by the emotion's intentional content. The belief-desire model cannot satisfactorily account for either of these cases. My main purpose is to show that the emotions constitute an irreducible category in the explanation of action, to be understood by analogy with perception. Emotions are affective perceptions. Their affect gives them motivational force, and they (...) can rationalize actions because, like perception, they have a representational intentional content. Because of this, an emotion can non-inferentially justify a belief which in its turn justifies or rationalizes an action; so emotions may constitute a source of moral knowledge. (shrink)

During performative artistic projects in Ambient Art, both space and structures of embodiment are constituted. I illustrate this thesis with examples of performative works in music, theatre and art, in order to analyze the transdisciplinary phenomenon of Ambient Art as a complex structure. My point of departure is a model of lived space in which the bodily enactment in the performative artwork produces place and, vice versa, the place of the artwork determines the active body as an immersive aesthetic experience.

Was macht heute die Wirklichkeit der Familie aus und wie erklart sich ihre Vernachlassigung im protestantisch-ethischen Diskurs? Beide Fragen hangen sachlich zusammen: Sabine Plonz entwickelt einen praxis- und regimetheoretischen Begriff der Familie, der normative Aspekte einbezieht. Sie stellt dar, wie restaurativ und patriarchalisch denkende protestantische Akteure die Ideologie- und Sozialgeschichte von Wohlfahrtsstaat und Familie beeinflusst haben; und sie zeigt, wie diese Moraldiskurse den Regimewandel spiegeln. Viele Quellenzitate machen die Rekonstruktion lebendig. Uberlegungen zu einer evangelischen Ethik des privaten Lebens nehmen (...) die gewonnenen Einsichten auf. Das Werk konfrontiert die Theologie erstmals mit hegemonie-, geschlechter- und religionskritischen Analysen ihrer Diskurse. Es erganzt die Familien-, Wohlfahrts- und Geschlechterforschung um die Dimension des Moralregimes. So eroffnet das engagiert geschriebene Buch neue Perspektiven fur Ethik und politische Praxis. (shrink)

Sabine Fourrier et al. Le dépot archaïque d'Amathonte, III. Les petits objets p. 67-118 Cet article présente les petits objets découverts dans un remblai d'époque archaïque, déposé contre le rempart Nord de la ville basse d'Amathonte. Le matériel, riche et varié, reflète les différentes fonctions du palais, dont il provient. Plusieurs types sont inédits ou seulement attestés parmi les trouvailles du palais de l'acropole. Certaines catégories, comme les figurines de terre cuite ou les marques incisées sur vases, sont particulièrement (...) bien représentées. Malgré leur aspect souvent fragmentaire, ces objets donnent une vue d'ensemble du mobilier que contenait le palais archaïque d'Amathonte. (shrink)

‘Scientific advice to politics’, the ‘nature of expertise’, and the ‘relation between experts, policy makers, and the public’ are variations of a topic that currently attracts the attention of social scientists, philosophers of science as well as practitioners in the public sphere and the media. This renewed interest in a persistent theme is initiated by the call for a democratization of expertise that has become the order of the day in the legitimation of research funding. The new significance of ‘participation’ (...) and ‘accountability’ has motivated scholars to take a new look at the science – politics interface and to probe questions such as "What is new in the arrangement of scientific expertise and political decision-making?", "How can reliable knowledge be made useful for politics and society at large, and how can epistemically and ethically sound decisions be achieved without losing democratic legitimacy?", "How can the objective of democratization of expertise be achieved without compromising the quality and reliability of knowledge?" Scientific knowledge and the ‘experts’ that represent it no longer command the unquestioned authority and public trust that was once bestowed upon them, and yet, policy makers are more dependent on them than ever before. This collection of essays explores the relations between science and politics with the instruments of the social studies of science, thereby providing new insights into their re-alignment under a new régime of governance. (shrink)

As the cognitive neurosciences set out to challenge our understanding of consciousness, the existing conceptual panoply of meanings attached to the term remains largely unaccounted for. By way of bibliometric analysis, the following study first reveals the breadth and shift of meanings over the last decades, the main tendency being a more 'brainy' concept of consciousness. On this basis, the emergence of consciousness studies is regarded as a 'trading zone' (Galison) in which experimental, philosophical and experiential accounts are dialectically engaged. (...) Outside of academic discourse, a neurocognitive concept of consciousness is embraced by popular self-help literature that sweepingly adopts this new discourse and the novel neuropharmacological tools in the self-help toolbox. Consciousness studies are hence not only the product of epistemological and methodological struggles (scientific dimension) but also part of the current re-alignments regarding the notion of consciously acting selves in society (societal dimension). (shrink)

'A comprehensive and important collection that includes essays by some of the leading figures in the field....Essential reading for anyone interested in risk assessment.' Professor Kristin Shrader-Frechette, University of Notre Dame 'The editors are to be congratulated for bringing together a distinguished international group of theorists to reflect on the issues. This volume will be sure to raise the level of debate while at the same time showing the importance of philosophical reflection in approaches to the problems of the age.' (...) Professor Jonathan Wolff, University College London This volume brings together top authors from the fields of risk, philosophy, social sciences and psychology to address the issue of how we should decide how far technological risks are morally acceptable or not. The underlying principles are examined, along with methodological challenges, public involvement and instruments for democratization. A strong theoretical basis is complemented by a range of case studies from some of the most contentious areas, including medical ethics and GM crops. This book is a vital new resource for researchers, students and anyone concerned that traditional approaches to risk management don't adequately address ethical considerations. (shrink)

Beauchamp and Childress have performed a great service by strengthening the principle of respect for the patient's autonomy against the paternalism that dominated medicine until at least the 1970s. Nevertheless, we think that the concept of autonomy should be elaborated further. We suggest such an elaboration built on recent developments within the neurosciences and the free will debate. The reason for this suggestion is at least twofold: First, Beauchamp and Childress neglect some important elements of autonomy. Second, neuroscience itself needs (...) a conceptual apparatus to deal with the neural basis of autonomy for diagnostic purposes. This desideratum is actually increasing because modern therapy options can considerably influence the neural basis of autonomy itself.Sabine MNeuroScienceAndNorms: Ethical and Legal Aspects of Norms in Neuroimaging at Bonn University Hospital, Germany. Her main research interests are in neuroethics. She is coauthor of three German books about neuroethics and bioethics.Henrik Walter, M.D., Ph.D., is Full Professor of Medical Psychology at the University of Bonn, Germany, and vice-director of the Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy at the University Clinic of Bonn. He is author of Neurophilosophy of Free Will and editor of the book From Neuroethics to Neurolaw?. His research fields are biological psychiatry, cognitive neuroscience, neuroimaging, neurophilosophy, and neuroethics. (shrink)

Das Buch analysiert aus unterschiedlichen Perspektiven die Frage nach dem Subjekt in der feministischen Erkenntnistheorie.

While it has often been proposed that, fundamentally, Lorentz-invariance is not respected in a quantum theory of gravity, it has been difficult to reconcile deviations from Lorentz-invariance with quantum field theory. The most commonly used mechanisms either break Lorentz-invariance explicitly or deform it at high energies. However, the former option is very tightly constrained by experiment already, the latter generically leads to problems with locality. We show here that there exists a third way to integrate deviations from Lorentz-invariance into quantum (...) field theory that circumvents the problems of the other approaches. The way this is achieved is an extension of the standard model in which photons can have different speeds without singling out a preferred restframe, but only as long as they are in a quantum superposition. Once a measurement has been made, observables are subject to the laws of special relativity, and the process of measurement introduces a preferred frame. The speed of light can take on different values, both superluminal and subluminal (with respect to the usual value of the speed of light), without the need for Lorentz-invariance violating operators and without tachyons. We briefly discuss the relation to deformations of special relativity and phenomenological consequences. (shrink)

Les fouilles récentes dans la partie nord du site archéologique de Kition-Bamboula ont conduit à la découverte d’un puits tout à fait remarquable. Par sa forme tout d’abord, puisqu’il s’agit d’un puits à roue élévatrice d’eau, d’un type qui n’était jusqu’alors documenté, à Chypre, que pour des périodes plus récentes. Par son comblement ensuite, puisque ce dernier contenait, outre divers débris, un dépôt de trois enfants (périnatals) accompagnés de mobilier. Par sa date, enfin, puisqu’il atteste une occupation de la zone (...) au ive siècle apr. J.‑C., alors qu’on pensait le site abandonné. Cet article propose une étude complète du puits et de son comblement (à l’exception des restes fauniques, présentés dans un article séparé), que prolonge une réflexion sur le paysage urbain de Kition au début de l’Antiquité tardive. (shrink)

A contrarian scientist wrestles with the big questions that modern physics raises, and what physics says about the human condition Not only can we not currently explain the origin of the universe, it is questionable we will ever be able to explain it. The notion that there are universes within particles, or that particles are conscious, is ascientific, as is the hypothesis that our universe is a computer simulation. On the other hand, the idea that the universe itself is conscious (...) is difficult to rule out entirely. According to Sabine Hossenfelder, it is not a coincidence that quantum entanglement and vacuum energy have become the go-to explanations of alternative healers, or that people believe their deceased grandmother is still alive because of quantum mechanics. Science and religion have the same roots, and they still tackle some of the same questions: Where do we come from? Where do we go to? How much can we know? The area of science that is closest to answering these questions is physics. Over the last century, physicists have learned a lot about which spiritual ideas are still compatible with the laws of nature. Not always, though, have they stayed on the scientific side of the debate. In this lively, thought-provoking book, Hossenfelder takes on the biggest questions in physics: Does the past still exist? Do particles think? Was the universe made for us? Has physics ruled out free will? Will we ever have a theory of everything? She lays out how far physicists are on the way to answering these questions, where the current limits are, and what questions might well remain unanswerable forever. Her book offers a no-nonsense yet entertaining take on some of the toughest riddles in existence, and will give the reader a solid grasp on what we know-and what we don't know. (shrink)

We critically analyze the rationale of arguments from finetuning and naturalness in particle physics and cosmology, notably the small values of the mass of the Higgs-boson and the cosmological constant. We identify several new reasons why these arguments are not scientifically relevant. Besides laying out why the necessity to define a probability distribution renders arguments from naturalness internally contradictory, it is also explained why it is conceptually questionable to single out assumptions about dimensionless parameters from among a host of other (...) assumptions. Some other numerological coincidences and their problems are also discussed. (shrink)

This contribution analyzes a literary model of mediality, namely the representation of messengers in ‘Parzival’ by Wolfram von Eschenbach. On the one hand, this text conveys historical forms of mediality; on the other hand, there is also the specific mediality of the narrative text itself. It is suggested that the concept of metonymy could be helpful to model this double perspective. As far as the story is concerned, mediality is caused by spatial and temporal relationships and has a certain metonymic (...) character, because the messenger is not only a bearer of a signifier, but at the same time part of the signified. On the formal level, these relationships demonstrate a general principle of narrative organization and transmission. Several parts of the narrative text are repeated, thus creating a relationship between the original and the repetition. The messenger represents after all not only a historical medial phenomenon, but at the same time a narrative principle that could be described as “metonymic narration”. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 1 Seiten: 329-332.

The term body integrity identity disorder (BIID) describes the extremely rare phenomenon of persons who desire the amputation of one or more healthy limbs or who desire a paralysis. Some of these persons mutilate themselves; others ask surgeons for an amputation or for the transection of their spinal cord. Psychologists and physicians explain this phenomenon in quite different ways; but a successful psychotherapeutic or pharmaceutical therapy is not known. Lobbies of persons suffering from BIID explain the desire for amputation in (...) analogy to the desire of transsexuals for surgical sex reassignment. Medical ethicists discuss the controversy about elective amputations of healthy limbs: on the one hand the principle of autonomy is used to deduce the right for body modifications; on the other hand the autonomy of BIID patients is doubted. Neurological results suggest that BIID is a brain disorder producing a disruption of the body image, for which parallels for stroke patients are known. If BIID were a neuropsychological disturbance, which includes missing insight into the illness and a specific lack of autonomy, then amputations would be contraindicated and must be evaluated as bodily injuries of mentally disordered patients. Instead of only curing the symptom, a causal therapy should be developed to integrate the alien limb into the body image. (shrink)

not lie in the conceptual distinctions but in the perceived functions of metaphors and whether in the concrete case they are judged positive or negative. The ongoing debates reflect these concerns quite clearly~ namely that metaphors are judged on the basis of supposed dangers they pose and opportunities they offer. These are the criteria of evaluation that are obviously dependent on the context in which the transfer of meaning occurs. Our fundamental concern is indeed the transfer itself~ its prospects and (...) its limits. Looking at possible functions of metaphors is one approach to under standing and elucidating sentiments about them. The papers in this volume illustrate, by quite different examples, three basic functions of metaphors: illustrative, heuristic~ and constitutive. These functions rep resent different degrees of transfer of meaning. Metaphors are illustrative when they are used primarily as a literary device, to increase the power of conviction of an argument, for example. Although the difference between the illustrative and the heuristic function of metaphors is not great, it does exist: metaphors are used for heuristic purposes whenever "differences" of meaning are employed to open new perspectives and to gain new insights. In the case of "constitutive" metaphors they function to actually replace previous meanings by new ones. Sabine Maasen in her paper introduces the distinction between transfer and transforma tion. (shrink)

This book opens up a new route to the study of knowledge dynamics and the sociology of knowledge. The focus is on the role of metaphors as powerful catalysts and the book dissects their role in the construction of theories of knowledge and will therefore be of vital interest to social and cognitive scientists alike.

Imperial ceremony was a vital form of self-expression for late antique society. Sabine MacCormack examines the ceremonies of imperial arrivals, funerals, and coronations from the late third to the late sixth centuries A.D., as manifest in the official literature and art of the time. Her study offers us new insights into the exercise of power and into the social, political, and cultural significance of religious change during the Christianization of the Roman world.

“Acceptable Risk” – On the Rationality of Emotional Evaluations of Risk What is “acceptable risk”? That question is appropriate in a number of different contexts, political, social, ethical, and scienti c. Thus the question might be whether the voting public will support a risky proposal or project, whether people will buy or accept a risky product, whether it is morally permissible to pursue this or that potentially harmful venture, or whether it is wise or prudent to test or try out (...) some possibly dangerous hypothesis or product. But complicating all of these queries, the “sand in the machinery” of rational decision-making, are the emotions. It is often noted that voters are swayed by their passions at least as much as they are convinced by rational arguments. And it is obvious to advertisers and retailers that people are seduced by all sorts of appeals to their vanities, their fears, their extravagant hopes, their insecurities. At least one major thread of ethical discourse, the one following Kant, minimizes the importance of the emotions in favor of an emphatically rational decision-making process, and it is worth mulling over the fact that many of those who do not accept Kant’s ethical views more or less applaud his rejection of the “moral sentiment theory” of the time, promoted by such luminary philosophers as David Hume and Adam Smith. (shrink)

This article discusses the epistemology of design as a process, arguing specifically that sketching and drawing are essential modes of thinking and reasoning. It demonstrates that the commonly accepted notion of a spontaneous and intuitive vision in the mind’s eye—encapsulated in the cliché of the napkin sketch—obscures the exploratory inferences that are made while scribbling with a pencil on a sheet of paper. The draughtsperson, along with their work tools, modes of notation, specific techniques, and epistemic strategies as well as (...) the resulting design artefacts form milieus of reflection that facilitate complex processes of exploration. Case studies, including the genesis of the Mini by Alec Issigonis, samples of work by Alvar Aalto, and a reinterpretation of student sketches from a classical design study by Gabriela Goldschmidt, serve to illustrate how drawing inferences with pencil and paper occurs. (shrink)

I argue that, in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion, one does not violate a rational requirement of any sort. Rational requirements, as the expression has come to be used, are requirements of coherence. Accordingly, my argument is that there is nothing incoherent in any way about experiencing a recalcitrant emotion. One becomes incoherent only if one allows the emotion to influence one's reasoning and/or action, in which case one violates the ‘consistency principle’ and/or the ‘enkratic principle’. From the standpoint of rationality, (...) it would even be counterproductive to put subjects under the obligation that their emotional experiences and their evaluative judgements must always fit together. When we nevertheless intuitively sense that the subject is irrational in experiencing a recalcitrant emotion this is in cases in which the emotion challenges the subject's agential identity. However, emotions can, but need not, challenge one's agential identity, and, furthermore, perceptions can do so as well. In any case, challenges of this kind do not involve the violation of a rational requirement. (shrink)

Research questions and backgroundThis study explores a highly controversial issue of medical care in Germany: the decision to withhold or withdraw mechanical ventilation in critically ill patients. It analyzes difficulties in making these decisions and the physicians’ uncertainty in understanding the German terminology of Sterbehilfe, which is used in the context of treatment limitation. Used in everyday language, the word Sterbehilfe carries connotations such as helping the patient in the dying process or helping the patient to enter the dying process. (...) Yet, in the legal and ethical discourse Sterbehilfe indicates several concepts: (1) treatment limitation, i.e., withholding or withdrawing life-sustaining treatment (passive Sterbehilfe), (2) the use of medication for symptom control while taking into account the risk of hastening the patient’s death (indirekte Sterbehilfe), and (3) measures to deliberately terminate the patient’s life (aktive Sterbehilfe). The terminology of Sterbehilfe has been criticized for being too complex and misleading, particularly for practical purposes. Materials and methods An exploratory study based on qualitative interviews was conducted with 28 physicians from nine medical intensive care units in tertiary care hospitals in the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. The method of data collection was a problem-centered, semi-structured interview using two authentic clinical case examples. In order to shed light on the relation between the physicians’ concepts and the ethical and legal frames of reference, we analyzed their way of using the terms passive and aktive Sterbehilfe. Results Generally, the physicians were more hesitant in making decisions to withdraw rather than withhold mechanical ventilation. Almost half of them assumed a categorical prohibition to withdraw any mechanical ventilation and more than one third felt that treatment ought not to be withdrawn at all. Physicians showed specific uncertainty about classifying the withdrawal of mechanical ventilation as passive Sterbehilfe, and had difficulties understanding that terminating ventilation is not basically illegal, but the permissibility of withdrawal depends on the situation. Conclusions The physicians’ knowledge and skills in interpreting clinical ethical dilemmas require specific improvement on the one hand; on the other hand, the terms passive and aktive Sterbehilfe are less clear than desirable and not as easy to use in clinical practice. Fear of making unjustified or illegal decisions may motivate physicians to continue (even futile) treatment. Physicians strongly opt for more open discussion about end-of-life care to allow for discontinuation of futile treatment and to reduce conflict. (shrink)